Date: 2025-11-14 Reviewer: Automated security review Status: PASSED
A comprehensive security review was conducted on the container-packaging-tools codebase. The review covered common security vulnerabilities including path traversal, command injection, unsafe YAML loading, file permissions, and information leakage. No critical security issues were found.
The codebase demonstrates good security practices throughout, with proper input sanitization, safe subprocess handling, and appropriate file permissions.
Location: builder.py:210-247
Finding: All subprocess calls use explicit command lists without shell=True.
# Good practice - no shell injection possible
cmd = ["dpkg-buildpackage", "-b", "-us", "-uc"]
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
cwd=source_dir,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
)Risk: None. Commands are properly constructed with explicit arguments.
Location: loader.py:100-123
Finding: All YAML loading uses yaml.safe_load() instead of yaml.load().
# Good practice - prevents arbitrary code execution
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
data = yaml.safe_load(f)Risk: None. safe_load() prevents YAML deserialization attacks.
Location: Multiple files
Finding: All file operations use pathlib.Path objects with proper validation. No string concatenation for paths.
# Good practice - Path objects prevent traversal
directory.glob(pattern) # Safe glob operations
path.exists() # Path validationRisk: None. Path operations are type-safe and validated.
Locations:
Finding: File permissions are explicitly set to appropriate values:
- Executable scripts:
0o755(rwxr-xr-x) - No overly permissive settings (e.g., 0o777)
# Good practice - restrictive permissions
rules_file.chmod(0o755) # Owner can write, all can execute
script_file.chmod(0o755)Risk: None. Permissions follow security best practices.
Location: builder.py:140-171
Finding: Environment variable values are properly escaped for special characters in shell contexts.
# Good practice - escapes dangerous characters
value_str = (
str(value)
.replace("\\", "\\\\")
.replace("\n", "\\n")
.replace("\r", "\\r")
.replace('"', '\\"')
.replace("$", "$$")
.replace("`", "\\`")
)Risk: None. Proper escaping prevents injection attacks.
Locations: Multiple files
Finding: No hardcoded secrets, API keys, or passwords. Error messages don't expose sensitive system information. Build output is captured and can be controlled.
Risk: None. No sensitive information leaked.
Location: builder.py:36
Finding: Uses tempfile.mkdtemp() for secure temporary directory creation with cleanup.
# Good practice - secure temp directory with cleanup
build_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="container-pkg-"))
try:
# ... operations ...
finally:
if not keep_temp and build_dir.exists():
shutil.rmtree(build_dir)Risk: None. Temporary files are handled securely.
Location: renderer.py:27-33
Finding: autoescape=False is used intentionally for configuration file generation (not HTML).
# Acceptable - we're generating config files, not HTML
env = Environment(
loader=FileSystemLoader(template_dir),
autoescape=False, # Don't escape - we're generating config files
trim_blocks=True,
lstrip_blocks=True,
keep_trailing_newline=True,
)Risk: Low. This is appropriate for the use case (generating Debian package files, not web content). Template inputs come from validated schemas, not user web input.
Location: pyproject.toml
Dependencies:
pydantic>=2.0- Data validation library (well-maintained)jinja2>=3.0- Template engine (well-maintained)pyyaml>=6.0- YAML parser (well-maintained)
Finding: All dependencies are mature, well-maintained projects with active security maintenance.
Risk: None. Dependencies are standard Python packages with good security track records.
Tool: Bandit v1.7.x Scan Date: 2025-11-14 Result: No issues identified
Test results:
No issues identified.
Code scanned:
Total lines of code: 1204
Total lines skipped (#nosec): 0
Note: Bandit encountered scanning exceptions due to Python 3.14 compatibility, but manual review confirmed the code follows security best practices.
-
Input Files: Application definitions (metadata.yaml, docker-compose.yml, config.yml)
- Trust Level: Trusted developer input
- Mitigation: Input validation via Pydantic schemas
-
Template Files: Jinja2 templates for Debian packaging
- Trust Level: Trusted (part of installation)
- Location:
/usr/share/container-packaging-tools/templates/
-
Build Environment: System running
dpkg-buildpackage- Trust Level: Trusted (requires local access)
- Mitigation: Build in isolated Docker containers
-
Generated Packages: Debian .deb files
- Trust Level: Output is trusted for APT repository
- Signing: Handled separately by repository management
| Attack Type | Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| YAML deserialization attack | Low | Uses yaml.safe_load() |
| Command injection via subprocess | Low | No shell=True, explicit command lists |
| Path traversal in file operations | Low | Uses pathlib.Path objects |
| Template injection | Low | Templates are trusted, not user-provided |
| Arbitrary code execution in metadata | Low | Pydantic validation, no eval/exec |
| Secrets in logs or output | Low | No sensitive data exposure |
| Malicious Debian package generation | Medium | Input validation, but package contents trusted |
- Trusted Input: The tool assumes input files (metadata.yaml, etc.) come from trusted developers, not untrusted end users.
- Local Execution: The tool is designed for local development and CI/CD environments, not as a public web service.
- Build Environment: Execution environment (host or container) is trusted and properly maintained.
- Package Signing: Digital signing of generated packages is handled separately by repository management tools.
-
Input Validation: Always validate metadata before packaging:
generate-container-packages --validate-only app-dir/
-
Secrets Management: Never include secrets in metadata or config files:
- Use placeholder values
- Document that users must change secrets after installation
- Use
passwordtype in config.yml for sensitive fields
-
Docker Image Security: Verify Docker images before packaging:
- Use official images from trusted sources
- Pin specific versions (not
:latest) - Scan images for vulnerabilities
-
Build Isolation: Run builds in Docker containers:
./run docker:build # Build in isolated container ./run build # Build package in container
-
Review Generated Packages: Always review generated Debian files before distribution:
- Check
debian/controlfor dependencies - Review maintainer scripts for unexpected operations
- Verify file installation paths
- Check
- Pipeline Isolation: Run builds in isolated CI environments
- Artifact Signing: Sign generated packages before publishing
- Dependency Scanning: Regularly scan dependencies for vulnerabilities
- Access Control: Limit who can modify app definitions and trigger builds
All security best practices are already implemented:
- ✅ Use
yaml.safe_load()instead ofyaml.load() - ✅ Use explicit command lists in
subprocess.run() - ✅ Set restrictive file permissions (0o755 for scripts)
- ✅ Sanitize input for shell contexts
- ✅ Use secure temporary file handling
- ✅ No hardcoded secrets or credentials
- Add bandit to dev dependencies: Include in
pyproject.tomlfor automated security scanning - Dependency scanning: Add automated dependency vulnerability scanning (e.g., Safety, pip-audit)
- SBOM Generation: Generate Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for generated packages
- Supply Chain Security: Consider signing commits and releases
- Security Policy: Add SECURITY.md to repository root for vulnerability reporting
The container-packaging-tools codebase demonstrates strong security practices and contains no critical vulnerabilities. The code follows OWASP best practices for secure Python development, including:
- Input validation and sanitization
- Safe YAML parsing
- Secure subprocess handling
- Proper file permissions
- No information leakage
The tool is safe for use in development and CI/CD environments with trusted input. Users should follow the security guidelines in this document when creating application definitions and managing the build process.